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Abstract
This paper continues the study, initiated by Cole and Fleischer in [1],
of the behavior of a tatonnement price update rule in Ongoing Fisher
Markets. The prior work showed fast convergence toward an equilib-
rium when the goods satisfied the weak gross substitutes property and
had bounded demand and income elasticities.
The current work shows that fast convergence also occurs for the fol-
lowing types of markets:
• All pairs of goods are complements to each other, and
• the demand and income elasticities are suitably bounded.
In particular, these conditions hold when all buyers in the market are
equipped with CES utilities, where all the parameters ρ, one per buyer,
satisfy −1 < ρ ≤ 0.
In addition, we extend the above result to markets in which a mixture
of complements and substitutes occur. This includes characterizing a
class of nested CES utilities for which fast convergence holds.
An interesting technical contribution, which may be of independent
interest, is an amortized analysis for handling asynchronous events in
settings in which there are a mix of continuous changes and discrete
events.
∗Courant Institute, New York University
†Courant Institute, New York University
‡Goldman Sachs & Co., New York
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1 Introduction
This paper continues the investigation, begun in [1, 2] of when a tatonnement-
style price update in a dynamic market setting could lead to fast convergent
behavior. This paper shows that there is a class of markets with comple-
mentary goods which enjoy fast convergence; prior results applied only to
goods which are substitutes.
The impetus for this work comes from the following question: why might
well-functioning markets be able to stay at or near equilibrium prices? This
raises two issues: what are plausible price adjustment mechanisms and in
what types of markets are they effective?
This question was considered in [3], which suggested that prices adjust
by tatonnement: upward if there is too much demand and downward if
too little. Since then, the study of market equilibria, their existence, sta-
bility, and their computation has received much attention in economics,
operations research, and most recently in computer science. A fairly re-
cent account of the classic perspective in economics is given in [4]. The
recent activity in computer science has led to a considerable number of
polynomial time algorithms for finding approximate and exact equilibria
in a variety of markets with divisible goods; we cite a selection of these
works [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15]. However, these algorithms do not
seek to, and do not appear to provide methods that might plausibly explain
these markets’ behavior.
We argue here for the relevance of this question from a computer sci-
ence perspective. Much justification for looking at the market problem in
computer science stems from the following argument: If economic models
and statements about equilibrium and convergence are to make sense as
being realizable in economies, then they should be concepts that are com-
putationally tractable. Our viewpoint is that it is not enough to show that
the problems are computationally tractable; it is also necessary to show
that they are tractable in a model that might capture how a market works.
It seems implausible that markets with many interacting players (buyers,
sellers, traders) would perform overt global computations, using global in-
formation.
Recently, a different perspective was put forward in [16], which argues
that the fundamental question is whether computationally tractable in-
stances of the model can fit rational data sets. But at this point, to the
best of our knowledge, there are no results for the market problem.
It has long been recognized that the tatonnement price adjustment model
is not fully realistic: for example, [17] states: “such a model of price adjust-
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ment · · · describes nobody’s actual behavior.” Nonetheless, there has been
a continued interest in the plausibility of tatonnement, and indeed its pre-
dictive accuracy in a non-equilibrium trade setting has been shown in some
experiments [18].
Plausibly, in many consumer markets buyers are myopic: based on the
current prices, goods are assessed on a take it or leave it basis. It seems
natural that this would lead to out of equilibrium trade. This is the type
of setting which was studied in [1] and in which we will address our main
question: under what conditions can tatonnement style price updates lead
to convergence?
1.1 The Market Problems
The One-Time Fisher Market1 A market comprises a set of goods G =
{G1, G2, · · · , Gn}, and two sets of agents, buyers B = {B1, B2, · · · , Bm},
and sellers S. The sellers bring the goods G to market and the buyers bring
money with which to buy them. The trade is driven by a collection of prices
pi for good Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For simplicity, we assume that there is a distinct
seller for each good; further it suffices to have one seller per good. The seller
of Gi brings a supply wi of this good to market. Each seller seeks to sell its
goods for money at the prices pi.
Each buyer Bℓ comes to market with money bℓ; Bℓ has a utility function
uℓ(x1ℓ, · · · , xnℓ) expressing its preferences: if Bℓ prefers a basket with xiℓ
units to the basket with yiℓ units, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then uℓ(x1ℓ, · · · , xnℓ) >
uℓ(y1ℓ, · · · , ynℓ). Each buyer Bℓ intends to buy goods costing at most bℓ so
as to achieve a personal optimal combination (basket) of goods.
Prices p = (p1, p2, · · · , pn) are said to provide an equilibrium if, in addi-
tion, the demand for each good is bounded by the supply:
∑m
ℓ=1 xiℓ ≤ wi,
and if pi > 0 then
∑m
ℓ=1 xiℓ = wi.
The market problem is to find equilibrium prices.2 The symbol ∗ marking
a variable will be used to denote the value of the variable at equilibrium.
The Fisher market is a special case of the more general Exchange or
Arrow-Debreu market.
While we define the market in terms of a set of buyers B, all that matters
for our algorithms is the aggregate demand these buyers generate, so we will
1The market we describe here is often referred to as the Fisher market. We use a
different term because we want to distinguish it from the Ongoing Fisher Market model
described below.
2Equilibria exist under quite mild conditions (see [19] §17.C, for example).
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tend to focus on properties of the aggregate demand rather than properties
of individual buyers’ demands.
Standard notation xi =
∑
l xil is the demand for good i, and zi = xi−wi
is the excess demand for good i (which can be positive or negative). si = pixi
is the total spending on good i by all buyers. Note that while w is part of
the specification of the market, x and z are functions of the vector of prices
as determined by individual buyers maximizing their utility functions given
their available money. We will assume that xi is a function of the prices p,
that is a collection of prices induce unique demands for each good.
In order to have a realistic setting for a price adjustment algorithm,
it would appear that out-of-equilibrium trade must be allowed, so as to
generate the demand imbalances that then induce price adjustments. But
then there needs to be a way to handle excess supply and demand. To this
end, we suppose that for each good there is a warehouse which can meet
excess demand and store excess supply. Each seller has a warehouse of finite
capacity to enable it to cope with fluctuations in demand. It changes prices
as needed to ensure its warehouse neither overfills nor runs out of goods.
The Ongoing Fisher Market [1] The market consists of a setG of n goods
and a set B of m buyers. The seller of good i, called Si, has a warehouse of
capacity χi. As before, each buyer Bℓ has a utility function uℓ(x1ℓ, · · · , xnℓ)
expressing its preferences. The market repeats over an unbounded number
of time intervals called days. Each day, each seller Si receives wi new units
of good i, and each buyer Bℓ is given bℓ money. Each day, Bℓ selects a
maximum utility basket of goods (x1ℓ, · · · , xnℓ) of cost at most bℓ. Si, for
each good i, provides the demanded goods xi =
∑m
ℓ=1 xiℓ. The resulting
excess demand or surplus, zi = xi − wi, is taken from or added to the
warehouse stock.
Given initial prices p◦i , warehouse stocks v
◦
i , where 0 < v
◦
i < χi, 1 ≤ i ≤
n, and ideal warehouse stocks v∗i , 0 < v
∗
i < χi, the task is to repeatedly
adjust prices so as to converge to equilibrium prices with the warehouse
stocks converging to their ideal values; for simplicity, we suppose that v∗i =
χi/2.
We suppose that it is the sellers that are adjusting the prices of their
goods. In order to have progress, we require them to change prices at least
once a day. However, for the most part, we impose no upper bound on
the frequency of price changes. This entails measuring demand on a finer
scale than day units. Accordingly, we assume that each buyer spends their
money at a uniform rate throughout the day. (Equivalently, this is saying
that buyers with collectively identical profiles occur throughout the day,
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though really similar profiles suffice for our analysis.) If one supposes there
is a limit to the granularity, this imposes a limit on the frequency of price
changes.
Notation We let vi denote the current contents of warehouse i, and v
e
i =
vi − v
∗
i denote the warehouse excess (note that v
e
i ∈ [−χi/2, χi/2]).
Market Properties We recall from [1] that the goal of the ongoing market
is to capture the distributed nature of markets and the possibly limited
knowledge of individual price setters. One important aspect is that the
price updates for distinct goods are allowed to occur independently and
asynchronously. We refer the reader to the prior work for a more extensive
discussion.
1.2 Our Contribution
As it is not possible to devise a tatonnement-style price update for general
markets [20, 21, 22], the goal, starting in [1], has been to devise plausible
constraints that enable rapid convergence. This entails devising (i) a rea-
sonable model, (ii) a price update algorithm, (iii) a measure of closeness to
equilibrium, and then (iv) analyzing the system to demonstrate fast conver-
gence; (v) this also entails identifying appropriate constraints on the market.
(i)–(iii) were addressed in [1], though there was an unsatisfactory element
to the price update rule when coming close to breaching a warehouse bound
(i.e. the warehouse becoming empty or full); this is fixed in the current work.
The constraints in [1] were for markets of substitutes. These constraints
take the form of bounds on the elasticities of demand and wealth (de-
fined later). Curiously, the best performance occurred at the boundary
between substitutes and complements (with the buyers having so-called
Cobb-Douglas utilities). Despite this, the result did not extend into the
complements domain. The present paper carries out such an extension,
handling markets in which a mixture of complements and substitutes occur.
The markets for which we show convergence again have bounded elastici-
ties (the precise constraints are detailed later). These markets include the
following scenarios.
1. All the goods are complements. A particular instance of this setting
occurs when each buyer has a CES utility with parameter ρ satisfying
−1 < ρ ≤ 0 (defined later).
2. (A generalization of (1)) The goods are partitioned into groups. Each
group comprises substitutes, while the groups are complementary. A
5
particular instance of this setting occurs when each buyer has a suit-
able 2-level nested CES utility [23] (defined later).
3. Each buyer has a suitable arbitrary depth nested CES utility.
Overall, we believe this result significantly expands the class of markets for
which the rapid convergence of tatonnement is known to hold, and thereby
enhances the plausibility of tatonnement as a usable price adjustment mech-
anism.
There are relatively few positive results for markets of complementary
goods, and to the best of our knowledge none for tatonnement algorithms.
[24] gave a polynomial time algorithm based on convex programming to
compute equilibrium prices for an Exchange Market in which every agent has
a CES utitility with ρ in the range −1 ≤ ρ ≤ 0. [25] gave a polynomial time
algorithm for Fisher markets with Leontief utilities, which was generalized
in [26], which considered hybrid linear-Leontief utility functions, in which
goods are grouped, and within a group the utilities are Leontief, and the
group utilities are combined linearly.
The economics literature has many results concerning tatonnement, but
the positive results largely concerned markets in which utilities satisfied
weak gross substitutes, i.e. the goods were substitutes.
Finally we discuss the amortized analysis technique we introduce to han-
dle asynchronous events. We use a potential function φ which satisfies two
properties:
• dφdt ≤ −Θ(κ)φ for a suitable parameter κ > 0 whenever there is no
event.
• φ is non-increasing when an event occurs (a price update in our appli-
cation).
One can then conclude that φ(t) ≤ e−Θ(κ)tφ(0), and so φ decreases by at
least a 1−Θ(κ) factor daily (for κ = O(1)).
It is not clear how to craft a more standard amortized analysis, in which
φ changes only when an event occurs. The difficulty we face is that we model
the warehouse imbalances as changing continuously, and it is not clear how
to integrate the resulting cost with the gains from the price update events
if φ changes only discretely.
1.3 Roadmap
In Section 2 we state the price update rules and review the definitions of
elasticity. We state our main results in Section 3, Then in Section 4 we
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provide an outline of the analysis for markets where all the goods are com-
plementary, illustrating this with the scenario in which every buyer has a
CES utility function. Finally, in Section 5, we analyze the mixed comple-
ments and substitutes scenario, illustrating it first with markets in which
the buyers all have 2-level nested CES-like utilities, and then expanding the
result to arbitrary levels of nesting. Some of the proofs are deferred to the
appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We review the price update rule and the definitions of elasticities. The basic
price update rule for the one-time market, proposed in [1], is given by
pi ← pi
(
1 + λ ·min
{
1,
xi − wi
wi
})
, (1)
where 0 < λ ≤ 1 is a suitable parameter whose value depends on the market
elasticities.
In the ongoing market, the excess demand is computed as the excess
demand since the previous price change at time τi. Thus in Equation 1, xi
is replaced by the average demand since time τi, x¯i[τi, t] =
1
t−τi
∫ t
τi
xi(t) dt,
where t is the current time. Recall we assumed that each seller adjusts the
price of its good at least once each day, so t− τi ≤ 1.
In addition, one needs to take account of the warehouse excess, with
prices dropping if there is too much stock in the warehouse, and increasing
if too little. To this end, we define the target demand w˜i to be
w˜i := wi + κ(vi − v
∗
i ),
where κ > 0 is chosen to ensure that |κ(vi− v
∗
i )| ≤ δwi, for a suitable δ > 0.
Now, as in [1], we define the target excess demand to be
z¯i := x¯i[τi, t]− w˜i = x¯i[τi, t]− wi − κ(vi − v
∗
i ).
As it takes time for the warehouse stock to adjust as a result of a price
change, it turns out that the price change needs to be proportional to the
time since the last price update (this is where the price update rule differs
from [1]). This yields the price update rule
pi ← pi
(
1 + λ ·min
{
1,
z¯i
wi
}
∆t
)
, (2)
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where ∆t is the time since the last price update.
Implicitly, the price update rule is using a linear approximation to the
relationship between pi and xi. The analysis would be cleaner if the linear
update were to log pi; however, this seems a less natural update rule, and
having a natural rule is a key concern when seeking to argue tatonnement
could be a real process.
Next, we review the definitions of income and price elasticity.
Definition 1. The income elasticity of the demand for good i by a buyer
with income (money) b is given by dxidb
/
xi
b . We let γ denote the least upper
bound on the income elasticities over all buyers and goods.
If all buyers are spending their budgets in full, then γ ≥ 1.
Definition 2. The price elasticity of the demand for good i is given by
−dxidpi
/
xi
pi
. We let α denote the greatest lower bound on the price elasticities
over all goods.
In a market of complementary goods 0 ≤ α ≤ 1; in the markets we
consider, α > γ/2 ≥ 1/2.
For the markets with mixed complements and substitutes we need a
generalized version of elasticity, which we call the Adverse Market Elasticity.
These are the extreme changes in demand that occur to one good, WLOG
G1, when its price changes, and other prices also change but by no larger
a fraction than p1. For suppose that p1 were reduced with the goal of
increasing x1. But suppose that at the same time other prices may change
by the same fractional amount (either up or down). How much can this
undo the desired increase in x1? The answer is that in general it can more
than undo it. However, our proof approach depends on x1 increasing in this
scenario, which is why we introduce this notion of elasticity and consider
those markets in which it is sufficiently bounded from below.
Definition 3. Define P¯ to be the following set of prices:
{
((1 + δ)p1, q2, · · · , qn) | for i ≥ 2, qi ∈ [
pi
1+δ , (1 + δ)pi]
}
.
The (low) Adverse Market Elasticity for G1 is defined to be
−max
p¯∈P¯
lim
δ→0
x1(p¯)− x1(p)
δx1
We let β be a lower bound on the Adverse Market Elasticity over all goods
and prices.
It is not hard to see that for the case that all the goods are complements,
β ≥ 2α− γ.
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3 Our Results
3.1 Markets with Complementary Goods
The analysis of these markets introduces the techniques needed for the more
general setting.
Our bounds will depend on the market parameters α and γ. It is conve-
nient to set β = 2α − γ; note that by assumption, 0 < β ≤ 1. In addition,
our bounds will depend on the initial imbalance in the prices. To specify
this we define the notion of f -bounded prices.
Definition 4.
fi(p) = max
(
pi
p∗i
,
p∗i
pi
)
,
and
f(p) = max
1≤i≤n
fi(p).
The prices are f -bounded if f(p) ≤ f .
Clearly, f(p) ≥ 1 and f(p) = 1 if and only if p = p∗. When there is no
ambiguity, we use f as a shorthand for f(p). We let fI denote the maximum
value f takes on during the first day, which will also bound f thereafter, as
we will see.
It will turn out that we can assume χi/wi are equal for all i; we denote
this ratio by r.
Our results will require λ and κ to obey the following conditions.
κ ≤
2
r
·min
{
β
4γ + β
,
1
2(8 + 4γ/β)
ln
1
2(1 − α)
}
(3)
24
r
≤ λ ≤ min
{
3
7
,
3
7
ln
1
2(1 − α)
,
√
κr
32
}
. (4)
We then show the following bound on the convergence rate.
Theorem 1. Suppose that β > 0, the prices are f -bounded throughout the
first day, and in addition that Equations (3)–(4) hold. Let M =
∑
j bj be
the daily supply of money to all the buyers. Then the prices become (1+ η)-
bounded after O
(
1
λ ln f +
1
λβ ln
1
δ +
1
κ log
M
ηmini wip∗i
)
days.
We also bound the needed warehouse sizes. We say that warehouse i is
safe if vi ∈ [
1
4χi,
3
4χi]. We define d(f) = maxi xi/wi when the prices are
f -bounded. In a market of complementary goods, d(f) ≤ fγ .
9
As we will see, the analysis of Theorem 1 proceeds in two phases. We
need to specify some parameters relative to Phase 1. We define v(fI) to
be the total net change to vi during Phase 1. As we will see, v(fI) =
O(wiλ d(fI) +
wi
λβd(2) log
β
δ ). We define D(f) to be the duration of Phase 1 in
days. As we will see, D(f) = O
(
1
λ ln f +
1
λβ ln
1
δ
)
. We will show:
Theorem 2. Suppose that the ratios χi/wi are all equal. Suppose that the
prices are always f -bounded. Also suppose that each price is updated at
least once a day. Suppose further that initially the warehouses are all safe.
Finally, suppose that Equations (3)–(4) hold. Then the warehouse stocks
never either overflow or run out of stock; furthermore, after D(f) + 32β +
2
κ
days the warehouses will be safe thereafter.
3.1.1 Example Scenario: All buyers have CES Utilities with −1 <
ρ ≤ 0
We begin by reviewing the definition of CES utilities. We focus on a single
buyerBℓ, and to simplify notation, we let (y1, y2, · · · , yn) = (x1ℓ, x2ℓ · · · , xnℓ).
A CES utility has the form
u(y1, y2, · · · , yn) =
(
n∑
i=1
aiy
ρℓ
i
)1/ρℓ
.
It is well known that when ρℓ ≥ 0, all goods are substitutes, and when ρℓ ≤ 0,
all goods are complements. We will focus on the case −1 < ρℓ ≤ 0. It is
also well known that with a budget constraint of b, the resulting demands
are given by yi = p
r
i ba
−r
i
(∑n
j=1
pr+1j
ar
j
)−1
, where r = 1/(ρℓ − 1). A further
calculation yields that ∂yi/∂piyi/pi ≤ r = −1/(1 − ρℓ). Let ρ = minℓ ρℓ. Then
∂xi/∂pi
xi/pi
≤ −1/(1 − ρ). In addition, it is easy to show that for CES utilities,
γ = 1. Consequently, when ρ > −1, β > 0; it follows that the bounds from
Theorems 1 and 2 apply.
3.2 Markets with Mixtures of Substitutes and Complements
To understand the constraints needed in this setting, we need to know that
the analysis for markets of complements, which we adapt to the current
setting, proceeds in two phases. Recall that the prices are f -bounded. In
Phase 1, (f−1) reduces multiplicatively each day. Phase 1 ends when further
such reductions can no longer be guaranteed. In Phase 2, an amortized
10
analysis shows that the misspending, roughly
∑
i |zi|pi+|w˜i−wi|pi, decreases
multiplicatively each day.
Also, now that substitutes are present, we will need an upper bound on
the price elasticity (see Definition 2), as in [1]. We let E ≥ 1 denote this
upper bound. For convergence we will need that λ = O(1/E).
Denote the spending on all goods which are substitutes of G1 by Ss and
the spending on all goods which are complements of G1 by Sc. We need to
introduce a further constraint. The reason is that the amortized analysis
depends on showing the misspending decreases. However, the current con-
straints do not rule out the possibility that when, say p1 is increased, the
spending decrease on G1’s complements, |∆Sc|, and the spending increase on
G1’s substitutes, |∆Ss|, are both larger than the reduction in misspending
on G1. It seems quite unnatural for this to occur. We rule it out with the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. Suppose that pi changes by ∆pi. Then there is a constant
α′ < 12 , such that |∆Sc| ≤ α
′xi|∆pi|.
We require that β, as defined in Definition 3, satisfy β > 0. Our results
will require λ and κ to obey the following conditions.
κ ≤
2
r
·min
{
β
β + 4(2E − β)
,
(1− 2α′)β
8α′(2E − β) + 4β
}
(5)
24
r
≤ λ ≤ min
{
1
8E + 4α′ − 6
,
√
κr
32
}
(6)
Theorem 3. Suppose that β > 0, the prices are f -bounded throughout the
first day, and Equations (5)–(6) hold. Let M =
∑
j bj be the daily supply of
money to all the buyers. Then the prices become (1 + η)-bounded after
O
(
1
λ
ln f +
1
λβ
ln
1
δ
+
1
κ
log
M
ηminiwip∗i
)
days.
Theorem 2 with Equations (5)–(6) replacing Equations (3)–(4) also con-
tinues to apply. Here d(f) ≤ f2E−β.
3.2.1 Example Scenario: 2-Level Nested CES Type Utilities
Keller [23] proposed and analyzed nested CES-type utility functions, which
we use to provide an example of utility functions yielding a mixture of
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substitutes and complements. Goods are partitioned into different groups.
Two goods in the same group are substitutes, while two goods in different
groups are complements.
Again, we focus on the demands (y1ℓ, y2ℓ, · · · , ynℓ) of a single buyer Bℓ.
For each group G, we define
uG,ℓ :=
∑
i∈G
aiℓ y
ρ
G,ℓ
iℓ
1/ρG,ℓ ,
which is called a utility component ; 0 < ρG,ℓ < 1. The overall utility function
is given by
uℓ :=
∑
G
aG,ℓ u
ρℓ
G,ℓ
1/ρℓ ,
where −1 < ρℓ < 0. The bounds on ρG,ℓ and ρℓ are needed to allow us to
show convergence; Keller allowed arbitrary values (no larger than 1).
We will show that E = maxG,ℓ
1
1−ρ
G,ℓ
and β = minℓ
2
1−ρℓ
−1. The bounds
from Theorems 3 and 2 will apply.
3.2.2 Example Scenario: N-Level Nested CES Type Utilities
This result extends to arbitrary levels of nesting. A Nested CES Type Utility
is best visualized as a utility tree. A leaf represents a good, and an internal
node represents a utility component. There is a value of ρ associated with
each internal node. Each utility component is of the form
(∑m
k=1 aku
ρ
k
)1/ρ
, in
which uk may be the quantity of one good xk or another utility component.
We focus on one particular good i. Let A1, A2, · · · , AN be the internal
nodes along the path from good i to the root of the utility tree, and let
ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρN be the associated ρ values. Let σk =
1
1−ρk
for 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
Define βi = σ1 − |σN − 1| −
∑N−1
q=1 |σq − σq+1|, Ei = max {1,max1≤k≤N σk}
and α′i = (1 − λ)
−E
(
|σN − 1|+
∑N−1
q=1 |σq − σq+1|
)
. We set β = mini βi,
E = maxiEi and α
′ = maxi α
′
i. Again, the bounds from Theorems 3 and 2
apply.
3.3 Comparison to Prior Work
[1] introduced the notion of ongoing markets and analyzed a class of ongoing
Fisher markets satisfying WGS. The current work extends this analysis to
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classes of ongoing Fisher markets with respectively, only complementary
goods, and with a mixture of complements and substitutes. The present
work also handles the warehouses in the ongoing model more realistically.
This entails a considerably changed analysis and some modest changes
to the price update rule. As in [1], the analysis proceeds in two phases.
The new analysis for Phase 1, broadly speaking, is similar to that in [1],
though a new understanding was needed to extend it to the new markets.
The analysis for Phase 2 is completely new. The analysis of the bounds on
the warehouse sizes is also new.
A preliminary unrefereed report on these techniques, applied to markets
of substitutes, was given in [27]; this manuscript included other results too
(on managing with approximate values of the demands, and on extending
the results to markets of indivisible goods). The current paper subsumes
the analysis techniques in [27].3
4 The Analysis for Complementary Goods
The largest challenge in the analysis is to handle the effect of warehouses.
In [1], the price updates increased in frequency as the warehouse limits
(completely full or empty) were approached, which ensured these limits were
not breached. It was still a non-trivial matter to demonstrate convergence.
In the present paper, the only constraint is that each price is updated at
least once every full day. This seems more natural, but entails a different
and new analysis.
The analysis partitions into two phases, the first one handling the situa-
tion when at least some of the prices are far from equilibrium, and for these
prices, the warehouse excesses have a modest impact on the updates. This
portion of the analysis is somewhat similar to the corresponding analysis
in [1], except that we manage to extend it to markets including comple-
mentary goods. In the second phase, the warehouse excesses can have a
significant effect. For this phase, we use a new and amortized analysis. The
imbalance being measured and reduced during Phase 2 is the misspending
(roughly speaking,
∑
i[pi|xi − wi| + pi|w˜i − wi|]). It is only when prices
are reasonably close to their equilibrium values that we can show the mis-
spending decreases, which is why two phases are needed. Interestingly, in
a market of substitutes, regardless of the prices, the misspending is always
3Note for the reviewers: This is the one refereed venue where these techniques are
being submitted for publication. We make this point because with an earlier submission
of this work, one referee appeared to consider [27] to be prior work.
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decreasing, so here one could carry out the whole analysis within Phase 2.
Phase 1 In Phase 1, we show that each day (f − 1) shrinks by a factor of
at least 1−Θ(λβ).
For simplicity, we begin by considering the one-time market.
Suppose that currently the prices are exactly f -bounded, and that there
is a good, WLOG good G1, with price p1 = p
∗
1/f . We will choose the market
properties to ensure that x1 ≥ f
βw1, regardless of the prices of the other
goods, so long as they are f -bounded. This ensures that the price update for
p1 will be an increase, by a factor of at least 1+λmin{1, (f
β −1)})
.
= 1+µ.
To demonstrate the lower bound on x1, we identify the following scenario
as the one minimizing x1: all the complements Gi of G1 have prices fp
∗
i .
A symmetric observation applies when p1 = fp
∗
1, and then the price
decreases by a factor of at least 1− λ(1− f−β)
.
= 1− ν.
We can show that the same market properties imply that after a day of
price updates every price will lie within the bounds [p∗(1+µ)/f, fp∗(1−ν)],
thereby ensuring a daily reduction of the term (f − 1) by a factor of at least
1−Θ(λβ).
We use a similar argument for the ongoing market. First, we observe
that if the price updates occurred simultaneously exactly once a day, then
exactly the same bounds would apply to x¯i, so the rate of progress would
be the same, aside the contribution of the warehouse excess to the price
update. So long as this contribution is small compared to (fβ − 1)w1 or
to (1 − f−β)w1, say at most half this value, then the price changes would
still be by a factor of at least 1+ 12λmin{1, (f
β − 1)}) and 1− 12λ(1− f
−β),
respectively.
To take account of the possible variability in price update frequency, we
demonstrate progress as follows: we can show that if the prices have been
f -bounded for a full day, then after two more days have elapsed, the prices
will have been f ′-bounded for a full day, for (f ′ − 1) = (1−Θ(λβ))(f − 1).
The reason we look at the f -bound over the span of a day is that the price
updates are based on the average excess demand over a period of up to one
day. A second issue we need to handle is that the price updates may have a
variable frequency; the only guarantee is that each price is updated within
one full day of its previous update. The net effect is that it takes one day
to guarantee that f shrinks and hence two days for the shrinkage to have
lasted at least one full day.
It follows that Phase 1 lasts O( 1λβ log[(fI − 1)/(fII − 1)]) days, where fI
is the initial value of f , and fII is its value at the start of Phase 2.
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We want the following conditions to hold in Phase 2: x¯i, xi ≤ (2− δ)wi
and pi ≤ 2p
∗
i . As we will see, choosing fII = min{(1 − 2δ)
−1/β , (2 − δ)1/γ}
suffices. As it turns out, the calculations simplify if we also enforce that
(1− 2δ)−1/β ≤ (2− δ)1/γ . If 2δ/β ≤ 12 , then 1 + 2δ/β ≤ fII ≤ 1 + 4δ/β ≤ 2.
As already argued, the behavior of the ongoing and one-time markets
are within a constant factor of each other in Phase 1 (the ongoing market
progresses in cycles of two days rather than one day, and reduces (f − 1) by
a factor in which λ is replaced by λ/2). So in this phase we analyze just the
one-time market.
First, we state several inequalities we use. They can be proved by simple
arithmetic/calculus.
Lemma 1. (a) If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, then 11+λ ≤ 1−
λ
2 .
(b) If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, then 1− λ(1− 1/x) ≤ x−λ/(2 ln 2).
(c) If 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and 1 ≤ x ≤ 2, then 11+λ(x−1) ≤ x
−λ.
Using the definitions of γ and α in Definitions 1 and 2, one can easily
obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2. (a) If the prices of all goods are raised from pi to p
′
i = qpi,
where q > 1, then x′i ≥ xi/q
γ .
(b) If the prices of all goods are reduced from pi to p
′
i = qpi, where q < 1,
then x′i ≤ xi/q
γ.
(c) If pi is raised to p
′
i = tpi, where t > 1, and all other prices are fixed,
then x′i ≤ xi/t
α.
(d) If pi is reduced to p
′
i = tpi, where t < 1, and all other prices are fixed,
then x′i ≥ xi/t
α.
Lemma 3. When the market is f -bounded,
1. if pi = rp
∗
i /f where 1 ≤ r ≤ f
2, then xi ≥ wif
2α−γr−α;
2. if pi = fp
∗
i /q where 1 ≤ q ≤ f
2, then xi ≤ wif
γ−2αqα.
Proof. We prove the first part; the second part is symmetric. By the
definition of complements, xi is smallest when pj = fp
∗
j for all j 6= i.
Consider the situation in which pk = fp
∗
k for all goods k. By Lemma
2(a), xi ≥
wi
fγ . Now reduce pi = fp
∗
i to pi = rp
∗
i /f . By Lemma 2(d),
xi ≥
wi
fγ(r/f2)α = wif
2α−γr−α.
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Lemma 4. Suppose that β = 2α − γ > 0. Further, suppose that the prices
are updated independently using price update rule (1), where 0 < λ ≤ 1. Let
p denote the current price vector and let p′ denote the price vector after one
day.
1. If f(p)β ≥ 2, then f(p′) ≤
(
1− λ2
)
f(p).
2. If f(p)β ≤ 2, then f(p′) ≤ f(p)1−λβ/(2 ln 2).
Proof. Suppose that pi = r
p∗i
f(p) , where 1 ≤ r ≤ f(p)
2. By Lemma 3, xi ≥
wif(p)
βr−α and hence xi−wiwi ≥ f(p)
βr−α − 1. When pi is updated using
price update rule (1), the new price p′i satisfies
p′i ≥ r
p∗i
f(p)
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)βr−α − 1
}]
.
Let h1(r) := r
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, (f(p)βr−α − 1)
}]
. Then
d
dr
h1(r) ≥ 1− λ+ (1− α)λf(p)
βr−α ≥ 0.
Thus
p′i ≥
p∗i
f(p)
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)β − 1
}]
.
Similarly, suppose that pj =
1
qf(p)p
∗
j , where 1 ≤ q ≤ f(p)
2. By Lemma
3, xj ≤ wjf(p)
−βqα and hence
xj−wj
wj
≤ f(p)−βqα − 1. When pj is updated
using price update rule (1), the new price p′j satisfies
p′j ≤
1
q
f(p)p∗j
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)−βqα − 1
}]
.
Let h2(q) :=
1
q
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)−βqα − 1
}]
. Then
d
dq
h2(q) ≤
1
q2
(
λ− 1− (1− α)λf(p)−βqα
)
≤ 0.
Thus
p′j ≤ f(p)p
∗
j
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)−β − 1
}]
= f(p)p∗j
[
1 + λ(f(p)−β − 1)
]
.
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Hence, after one day, a period in which each good updates its price at
least once, we can guarantee that f(p′) is at most
f(p) ·max
{
1− λ(1− f(p)−β),
1
1 + λ ·min {1, (f(p)β − 1)}
}
,
which, by Lemma 1(a), is at most
(
1− λ2
)
f(p) when f(p)β ≥ 2.
When f(p)β ≤ 2, by Lemma 1(b), 1 − λ(1 − f(p)−β) ≤ f(p)−λβ/(2 ln 2).
By Lemma 1(c), 1
1+λ(f(p)β−1)
≤ f(p)−λβ. So f(p′) ≤ f(p)1−λβ/(2 ln 2).
Theorem 4. Suppose that β > 0, λ ≤ 1, and that the prices are initially f -
bounded. When δ/β ≤ 1, Phase 1 will complete within O
(
1
λ ln f +
1
λβ ln
1
δ
)
days.
Proof. Suppose that initially f > 21/β and 1 + 2δ/β < 21/β . By Lemma
4, after n1 days, where n1 satisfies the inequality f
(
1− λ2
)n1
≤ 21/β , the
market is 21/β-bounded. It suffices that:
n1 =
ln f − 1β ln 2
ln
(
1− λ2
) = O( 1
λ
ln f
)
.
If 21/β ≤ 1 + 2δ/β, then O( 1λ ln f) days suffice.
After this, by Lemma 4, after an additional n2 days, the market becomesa
1 + (2δ/β)-bounded, if n2 satisfies the inequality (2
1/β)(1−λβ/(2 ln 2))
n2 ≤
1 + 2δ/β. It suffices that:
n2 =
ln β + ln ln(1 + 2δ/β) − ln ln 2
ln(1− λβ/(2 ln 2))
= O
(
1
λβ
(
ln
1
β
+ ln
1
δ
))
.
The last equality holds as δ/β ≤ 1 and hence ln ln(1 + 2δ/β) = ln (δ/β) +
O(1).
The sum n1 + n2 bounds the number of days Phase 1 lasts.
Comment. If we wish to analyze the one-time market or the ongoing
market without taking account of the warehouses, then arbitrarily accurate
prices can be achieved in Phase 1, and the time till prices are (1+η)-bounded,
for any η is given by the bound in Theorem 4, on replacing the term 1β log
1
δ
by 1β log
1
η .
To apply this analysis of Phase 1 to other markets, it suffices to identify
conditions that ensure x1 ≥ f
βw1 when p1 = p
∗
1/f , and x1 ≤ f
−β when
p1 = fp
∗
1.
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Phase 2 Once the warehouse excesses may have a large impact on the
price updates, we can no longer demonstrate a smooth shrinkage of the
term (f − 1). Instead, we use an amortized analysis. We associate the
following potential φi with good Gi.
φi := pi[span{x¯i, xi, w˜i} − c1λ(t− τi)|x¯i − w˜i|+ c2|w˜i − wi|],
where span{t1, t2, t3} = max{t1, t2, t3}−min{t1, t2, t3} and 1 ≥ c1 > 0, c2 >
1 are suitably chosen constants. We define φ :=
∑
i φi. The term −c1λ(t−
τi)|x¯i − w˜i| ensures that φ decreases smoothly when no price update is oc-
curring, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Suppose that 4κ(1 + c2) ≤ λc1 ≤ 1/2. If |w˜i − wi| ≤ 2 ·
span(xi, x¯i, w˜i), then
d φi
d t ≤ −
κ(1+c2)
1+2c2
φi and otherwise
d φi
d t ≤ −
κ(c2−1)
2c2
φi,
at any time when no price update is occuring (to any pj).
Proof. To simplify the presentation of this proof, let K denote κ(xi − wi)
and let S denote span(xi, x¯i, w˜i).
Note the following equalities: d xid t =
dwi
d t = 0,
d w˜i
d t = −K and
d x¯i
d t =
xi−x¯i
t−τi
. Then d c2|w˜i−wi|d t = −c2K · sign(w˜i − wi) and hence
dφi
d t
= pi
[
dS
d t
− c1λ|x¯i − w˜i| − c1λ(t− τi)
d |x¯i − w˜i|
d t
−c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)
]
= pi
[
dS
d t
− c1λ(xi − w˜i) · sign(x¯i − w˜i)
−c1λ(t− τi)K · sign(x¯i − w˜i)
−c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)
]
.
Next by means of a case analysis, we show that
dφi
d t
≤ pi [|K| − c1λS − c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)] . (7)
We show Case 1 in detail. Cases 2 and 3 are similar.
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Case 1: xi ≥ x¯i ≥ w˜i or w˜i ≥ x¯i ≥ xi.
dS
d t = K · sign(xi − w˜i).
dφi
d t
= pi [(K − c1λ(xi − w˜i)− c1λ(t− τi)K)sign(xi − w˜i)
−c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)]
= pi [K(1− c1λ(t− τi))sign(xi − w˜i)
−c1λ|xi − w˜i| − c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)]
≤ pi [|K| − c1λS − c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)] .
Case 2: xi ≥ w˜i ≥ x¯i or x¯i ≥ w˜i ≥ xi.
Case 3: w˜i ≥ xi ≥ x¯i or x¯i ≥ xi ≥ w˜i.
Now we use the bound from (7) to obtain the bounds on the derivatives
stated in the lemma. There are two cases: |w˜i−wi| ≤ 2S and |w˜i−wi| > 2S.
Case 1: |w˜i − wi| ≤ 2S.
Then |xi − wi| ≤ |xi − w˜i|+ |w˜i − wi| ≤ S + 2S = 3S. And
dφi
d t
≤ −c1λpiS + (1 + c2)pi|K|
≤ −c1λpiS + 3(1 + c2)piκS
= −(c1λ− 3(1 + c2)κ)piS
≤ −
c1λ− 3(1 + c2)κ
1 + 2c2
pi(S + c2|w˜i − wi|)
≤ −
c1λ− 3(1 + c2)κ
1 + 2c2
φi
≤ −
κ(1 + c2)
1 + 2c2
φi.
Case 2: |w˜i − wi| > 2S.
Then |w˜i − wi| ≤ |w˜i − xi|+ |xi − wi| ≤ S + |xi − wi| <
|w˜i−wi|
2 + |xi − wi|
and hence |w˜i − wi| < 2|xi − wi|. Note that sign(xi − wi) = sign(w˜i − wi),
so −c2K · sign(w˜i − wi) = −c2κ|xi − wi|.
dφi
d t
≤ −c1λpiS + κpi|xi − wi| − c2κpi|xi −wi|
= −c1λpiS − (c2 − 1)κpi|xi − wi|
< −c1λpiS −
c2 − 1
2
κpi|w˜i − wi|
< −
c2 − 1
2c2
κpi(c2S + c2|w˜i − wi|)
≤ −
κ(c2 − 1)
2c2
φi.
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The remaining task is to show that φ is non-increasing when a price
update occurs. This entails showing that the decrease to the term pi ·
span{x¯i, xi, w˜i} is at least as large as the increase to the term pic2|w˜i − wi|
plus the value of the term pic1λ(t− τi)|x¯i − w˜i|, which gets reset to 0.
Lemma 6. Let β = 2α − γ and suppose that β > 0 and the following
conditions hold:
1. f ≤ (1− 2δ)−1/β ≤ (2 − δ)1/γ since the last price update to pi;
2. α¯+ c1 + c2δ ≤ 1− δ;
3. (1 + δ + c1 + c2δ)λ ≤ 1,
where α¯ := 2(1−α)(1− 2δ)−γ/β
(
1 + αλ(1+δ)2(1−λ(1+δ))
)
. Then, when a price pi is
updated using rule (2), the value of φ stays the same or decreases.
If δ and λ are small, then
α¯ = (2− 2α)
(
1 +O
(
γδ
β
))
(1 +O(λ))
= 2− 2α+O
(
γδ
β
)
+O(λ),
and Condition (2) becomes 2− 2α+ c1 +O(δ(1 + γ/β)) +O(λ) ≤ 1, which
is satisfied on setting c1, λ, δ(1 + γ/β) = O(2α − 1). The third condition is
then satisfied by having λ = O(1). More precise bounds are given later.
To demonstrate a continued convergence of the prices during Phase 2, we
need to relate the prices to the potential φ. We show the following bound.
Theorem 5. Suppose that the conditions in Lemmas 5 and 6 hold. Let
M =
∑
j bj be the daily supply of money to all the buyers. Then, in Phase
2, the prices become (1 + η)-bounded after O
(
1
κ log
M
ηmini wip∗i
)
days.
Proof. During Phase 2, pi ≤ 2p
∗
i and xi ≤ 2wi. Consequently, φ = O(
∑
i p
∗
iwi) =
O(M). Once φ has shrunk to ηmini p
∗
iwi, we know that all prices are (1+η)-
bounded. Finally, Lemmas 5 and 6 imply that φ shrinks by a (1 − Θ(κ))
factor each day.
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If the updates in Phase 2 start with an initial value for the potential of
φI ≪M , then in the bound on the number of days one can replace M with
φI.
Summing the bounds from Theorems 4 (note that δ ≤ β) and 5, yields
Theorem 1, modulo showing that Equations (3)–(4) suffice to ensure the
conditions in Theorems 4 and 5.
4.1 Bounds on the Warehouse Sizes
Phase 1 Recall that fI is the initial value of f . Define d(f) = maxi xi/wi
when the prices are f -bounded. In a market of complementary goods, d(f) ≤
fγ . We can show:
Lemma 7. In Phase 1, the total net change to vi is bounded by O(
wi
λ d(fI)+
wi
λβd(2) log
β
δ ).
Phase 2 Because Phase 2 may last χ(1/κ) days, we cannot simply use a
bound on its duration to bound the capacity needed for warehouse i, for
its capacity is O(wiκ ), which could be smaller than the bound based on the
duration of Phase 2.
Instead, we observe that in Phase 2 the price adjustments are always
strictly within the bounds of 1±λ∆t, where ∆t is the time since the previous
update to pi. If vi ≤ χi/2− bwi, then an update of pi by a factor 1− λµ∆t,
implies that wi − x¯i ≥ (µwi + κbwi)∆t, and (wi − x¯i)∆t is exactly the
amount by which vi decreases between these two price updates. As the
prices are ((1 − 2δ)−β)-bounded, the difference between the price increases
and decreases is bounded, and consequently, over time the change to the
warehouse stock will be dominated by the sum of the κbwi∆t terms. This
is made precise in the following lemma (an analogous result applies if vi ≥
χi/2 + bwi).
Lemma 8. Let a1, a2, k > 0. Suppose that vi ≤ v
∗
i − a1wi and that κa1 ≥
4λ2. Let τ be the time of a price update of pi to pi,1. Suppose that henceforth
pi ≤ e
f¯pi,1 for some f¯ ≥ 0. If k ≥
2
κa1
(f¯ + a2), then by time τ + (k +1) the
warehouse stock will have increased to more than v∗i − a1wi, or by at least
a2wi, whichever is the lesser increase.
Proof. Suppose that vi ≤ v
∗
i −a1wi throughout (or the result holds trivially).
Each price change by a multiplicative (1+µ∆t) is associated with a target
excess demand z¯i = x¯i −wi − κ(vi − v
∗
i ), where zi = µwi. Furthermore, the
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increase to the warehouse stock since the previous price update is exactly
−(xi − wi)∆t = [−µwi − κ(vi − v
∗
i )]∆t ≥ (−µ+ κa1)wi∆t.
Note that 1+x ≥ ex−2x
2
for |x| ≤ 12 . Thus 1+µ∆t ≥ e
µ∆t−2λ2∆t (recall
that all price changes are bounded by 1± λ∆t).
Suppose that over the next k days there are l − 1 price changes; let the
next l price changes be by 1+µ1∆t1, 1+µ2∆t2, · · · , 1+µl∆tl. Note that the
total price change satisfies ef¯ ≥ Π1≤i≤l(1 + µi∆ti) ≥ e
∑
1≤i≤l(µi∆ti−2λ
2∆ti)).
Thus
∑
1≤i≤l∆ti(µi − 2λ
2) ≤ f¯ .
We conclude that when the l-th price change occurs, the warehouse stock
will have increased by at least
∑
1≤i≤l(−µi + κa1)wi∆ti ≥ −f¯ + k(−2λ
2 +
κa1)wi ≥ (−f¯ +
1
2kκa1)wi, both inequalities following because 4λ
2 ≤ κa1.
If k ≥ 2κa1 (f¯ + a2), then the warehouse stock increases by at least a2wi.
Comment. The relationship between the change in capacity and the size
of the price update is crucial in proving this lemma, and this depends on
having the factor ∆t in the price update rule.
To complete the analysis of Phase 2, we view each warehouse as having
8 equal sized zones of fullness, with the goal being to bring the warehouse
into its central four zones. The role of the outer zones is to provide a buffer
to cope with initial price imbalances.
Definition 5. The four zones above the half way target are called the high
zones, and the other four are the low zones. Going from the center outward,
the zones are called the central zone, the inner buffer, the middle buffer,
and the outer buffer. The warehouse is said to be safe if it is in one of its
central zones or one of its inner buffers.
Let D(fI) bound the duration of Phase 1 and let v(fI) be chosen so that
v(fI)wi bounds the change to vi, for all i, during Phase 1. We gave a bound
on v(fI) in Lemma 7.
We will assume that the ratios χi/wi are all the same, i.e. that every
warehouse can store the same maximum number of days supply. This will
be without loss of generality, for if the smallest warehouse can store only 2d
days supply, Theorem 2 in effect shows that every warehouse remains with
a stock within dwi of χi/2. An alternative approach is to suppose that each
seller Si has a separate parameter κi (replacing κ). The only effect on the
analysis is that the convergence rate is now controlled by κ = mini κi.
To prove Theorem 2 it will suffice that the following conditions hold. for
all i:
1. χi ≥
512
β wi and χi ≥ 8v(fI)wi.
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2. δ = κχi2wi .
3. λ2 ≤ κχi32wi .
Comment. We note that were the price update rule to have the form
p′i ← pie
λmin{1,z¯/wi}∆t rather than p′i ← pi(1 + λmin{1, z¯/wi}∆t) then the
constraint (3) in Theorem 2 would not be needed (this constraint comes from
setting a1 in Lemma 8 to the width of a zone). We call this alternate rule
the exponential price update rule. However, we prefer the form of the rule
we have specified as it strikes us as being simpler and hence more natural.
4.2 Condition Summary
Lemma 6 and Theorem 2 require several constraints on the parameters
κ, δ, λ, c1 , c2. We can unwind these conditions to show how these param-
eters depend on the market parameters α, γ and β.
Let r = χi/wi. Then the conditions can be satisfied when Equations (3)
and (4) hold. Note that r needs to be sufficiently large, or in other words χi
for every i needs to be sufficiently large, to ensure that there is a choice of
λ which satisfies both the upper and lower bounds. Further note that the
term
√
κτ
32 , which is due to Constraint (3), would not be needed were we to
use the exponential price update rule.
5 Markets with Mixtures of Substitutes and Com-
plements
For the markets with mixtures of substitutes and complements, we defined
Adverse Market Elasticity and made Assumption 1 in Section 3.2. Note that
for the case that all the goods are complements, β as defined in Definition
3 equals 2α− γ.
We can then show that Theorem 4 applies here too. We can also show
the following results, analogs of Lemma 6, and Theorems 5 and 1.
Lemma 9. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and β, as defined in Definition 3,
satisfies β > 0. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1. f ≤ (1− 2δ)−1/β ≤ (2 − δ)1/(2E−β) since the last price update to pi;
2. 2α′(1− 2δ)−(2E−β)/β + c1 + c2δ ≤ 1− δ;
3.
(
2α′′(1− 2δ)−(2E−β)/β + 1 + δ + c1 + c2δ
)
λ ≤ 1,
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where α′′ := α′+2(E − 1). Then, when a price pi is updated using rule (2),
the value of φ stays the same or decreases.
Theorem 6. Suppose that the conditions in Lemmas 5 and 9 hold. Let
M =
∑
j bj be the daily supply of money to all the buyers. Then, in Phase
2, the prices become (1 + η)-bounded after O
(
1
κ log
M
ηmini wip∗i
)
days.
Theorem 3 follows on summing the bounds from Theorems 4 and 6, and
on showing that Equations (3)–(4) imply the constraints in Lemmas 5 and
9. Theorem 2 also continues to apply unchanged. Here d(f) ≤ f2E−β.
5.1 Example Scenario: 2-Level Nested CES Type Utilities
We will use index i to denote a good, Gi to denote the group containing
good i, index j to a denote a good in Gi (but not good i) and index k to
denote a good in a group other than Gi. Denote the spending on all the
goods in the group Gi by sGi and the total income of the buyer by b. Keller
[23] derived the following formulae:
∂xi/∂pi
xi/pi
= −
1
1− ρGi
(
1−
si
sGi
)
−
1
1− ρ
(
si
sGi
−
si
b
)
−
si
b
∂xi/∂pj
xi/pj
=
sj
b
(
1
1− ρGi
b
sGi
−
1
1− ρ
(
b
sGi
− 1
)
− 1
)
∂sk
∂pi
=
sk
b
ρ
1− ρ
xi.
As 1 > ρG > 0, ρ < 0 and b ≥ sG,
∂xi
∂pj
≥ 0 and ∂xi/∂pixi/pi ≥ −
1
1−ρ
G
; i.e.
every pair of goods in the same group are substitutes and E = maxG
1
1−ρ
G
.
As ρ < 0, ∂sk∂pi < 0, which is equivalent to
∂xk
∂pi
< 0; i.e. two goods in
different groups are complements.
To compute β, we note that when pi changes by a factor t, the smallest
change in demand occurs if the prices for its substitutes, namely, the goods
in its group, all also change by t, while the prices for its complements,
namely all the other goods, change by a factor 1/t. As ρ < 0, ∂xi/∂pixi/pi +∑
j∈G,j 6=i
∂xi/∂pj
xi/pj
= − 11−ρ −
s
G
b
(
1− 11−ρ
)
≤ − 11−ρ . When the prices of all
goods are raised by a factor t > 1 and then the prices of all goods in G are
reduced by a factor 1/t2, x′i ≥ xit
2/(1−ρ)−1; when the prices of all goods are
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reduced by a factor t < 1 and then the prices of all goods in G are raised
by a factor 1/t2, x′i ≤ xit
2/(1−ρ)−1. Thus β = 21−ρ − 1.
Finally, note that
∑
k
∂sk
∂pi
=
∑
k sk
b
ρ
1−ρxi and |∆Sc| =
∑
k |∆sk|. When
pi is raised, x
′
i ≤ xi, and hence |∆Sc| ≤
−ρ
1−ρxi|∆pi|; when pi is reduced,
it is reduced by a factor of t ≥ (1 − λ). As x′i ≤ xi(1 − λ)
−E , |∆Sc| ≤
−ρ
1−ρ (1−λ)
−Exi|∆pi|. Thus Assumption 1 is satisfied with α
′ = −ρ1−ρ(1−λ)
−E .
Hence the bounds from Theorems 3 and 2 apply.
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A Potential Function Lemmas
We complete the proof of the missing cases for Lemma 5.
LEMMA 5. Suppose that 4κ(1 + c2) ≤ λc1 ≤ 1/2. If |w˜i − wi| ≤
2 · span(xi, x¯i, w˜i), then
d φi
d t ≤ −
κ(1+c2)
1+2c2
φi and otherwise
d φi
d t ≤ −
κ(c2−1)
2c2
φi,
at any time when no price update is occuring (to any pj).
Proof. To simplify the presentation of this proof, let K denote κ(xi − wi)
and let S denote span(xi, x¯i, w˜i). Here we show the details for Cases 2 and
3, which were deferred from the main paper.
Case 2: xi ≥ w˜i ≥ x¯i or x¯i ≥ w˜i ≥ xi.
dS
d t =
x¯i−xi
t−τi
· sign(xi − x¯i).
dφi
d t
= pi
[(
x¯i − xi
t− τi
+ c1λ(xi − w˜i) + c1λ(t− τi)K
)
sign(xi − x¯i)
−c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)
]
≤ pi [−|x¯i − xi|+ c1λ|xi − w˜i|+ |K| − c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)]
≤ pi [|K|+ (c1λ− 1)|x¯i − xi| − c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)]
≤ pi [|K| − c1λS − c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)] , as λc1 ≤
1
2 .
Case 3: w˜i ≥ xi ≥ x¯i or x¯i ≥ xi ≥ w˜i.
dS
d t =
(
xi−x¯i
t−τi
+K
)
· sign(x¯i − w˜i).
dφi
d t
= pi
[(
x¯i − xi
t− τi
−K + c1λ(xi − w˜i) + c1λ(t− τi)K
)
sign(w˜i − x¯i)
−c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)
]
≤ pi [−|x¯i − xi| − c1λ|xi − w˜i|
−K(1− c1λ(t− τi))sign(w˜i − x¯i)− c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)]
≤ pi [−c1λ|x¯i − xi| − c1λ|xi − w˜i|+ |K| − c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)]
= pi [|K| − c1λS − c2K · sign(w˜i − wi)] .
The following lemma provides an upper bound on the change to the
potential function when there is a price update. Subsequently, this lemma
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will be used to show that at a price update, the potential function stays
the same or decreases under suitable conditions. Recall that sj denotes the
spending on good j.
Lemma 10. Suppose pi is updated. Let Sinc :=
∑
j 6=i,∆sj>0
|∆sj | and
Sdec :=
∑
j 6=i,∆sj<0
|∆sj|.
1. If sign(xi − w˜i) is not flipped and xi moves towards w˜i, the change to
φ is at most
−w˜i|∆pi|+ sign(∆pi) ·∆si + Sinc + Sdec
+c1λpi|x¯i − w˜i|(t− τi) + c2δwi|∆pi|.
2. If sign(xi−w˜i) is not flipped and xi moves away from w˜i, or if sign(xi−
w˜i) is flipped, the change to φ is at most
−pi|x¯i − w˜i|+ w˜i|∆pi| − sign(∆pi) ·∆si + Sinc + Sdec
+c1λpi|x¯i − w˜i|(t− τi) + c2δwi|∆pi|.
Proof. Let p′i, x
′
i and s
′
i = p
′
ix
′
i denote the price of good Gi, the demand for
good Gi and the spending on good Gi after the price update respectively.
We separate the proof into three cases.
Case 1: sign(xi − w˜i) is not flipped and xi moves towards w˜i.
As xi moves towards w˜i, following the update, sign(∆pi) = sign(x¯i −
w˜i) = sign(xi − w˜i) = sign(x
′
i − w˜i).
Consider the term pi · span{x¯i, xi, w˜i}. Before the update to pi, it equals
pi · span{x¯i, xi, w˜i} ≥ pi|xi − w˜i| = (si − piw˜i) · sign(∆pi).
After the update,
pi · span{x¯i, xi, w˜i} = (pi +∆pi)|x
′
i − w˜i|
= (s′i − piw˜i − w˜i∆pi) · sign(∆pi).
Hence, the change to the term following the update is at most
(s′i − si − w˜i∆pi) · sign(∆pi) = sign(∆pi) ·∆si − w˜i|∆pi|.
For the terms −pic1λ(t − τi)|x¯i − w˜i| + c2pi|w˜i − wi|, an update on pi
resets τi to t and |w˜i − wi| ≤ δwi. Hence the change to these two terms is
at most c1λpi|x¯i − w˜i|(t− τi) + c2δwi|∆pi|.
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For any other good j, the terms −pjc1λ(t− τj)|x¯j − w˜j |+ c2pj |w˜j −wj |
do not change, and the term pj · span{x¯j , xj , w˜j} changes, but by at most
∆sj. In the worst case, the change of this term, summing over all j, is at
most Sinc + Sdec.
Case 2: sign(xi − w˜i) is not flipped and xi moves away from w˜i.
As xi moves away from w˜i, following the update, sign(∆pi) = sign(x¯i −
w˜i) 6= sign(xi − w˜i) = sign(x
′
i − w˜i).
Consider the term pi · span{x¯i, xi, w˜i}. Before the update to pi, it equals
pi|xi − x¯i| = pi|xi − w˜i|+ pi|w˜i − x¯i|
= (si − piw˜i) · (−sign(∆pi)) + pi|x¯i − w˜i|.
After the update,
(pi +∆pi)|x
′
i − w˜i| = (s
′
i − piw˜i − w˜i∆pi) · (−sign(∆pi)).
Hence the change to the term following the update is at most
−sign(∆pi)∆si + w˜i|∆pi| − pi|w˜i − x¯i|.
As in Case 1, there are further changes, but bounded above by Sinc +
Sdec + c1λpi|x¯i − w˜i|(t− τi) + c2δwi|∆pi|.
Case 3: sign(xi − w˜i) is flipped.
As sign(xi−w˜i) is flipped, xi moves toward w˜i initially, hence sign(∆pi) =
sign(x¯i − w˜i) = sign(xi − w˜i) 6= sign(x
′
i − w˜i).
Let x˜i = argmaxx∈{xi,x¯i}|x− w˜i|. Consider the term pi · span{x¯i, xi, w˜i}.
Before the update to pi, it equals
pi|x˜i − w˜i| = (pix˜i − piw˜i) · sign(∆pi).
After the update, it equals
(pi +∆pi)|x
′
i − w˜i| = (s
′
i − piw˜i − w˜i∆pi) · (−sign(∆pi)).
Hence the change to the term following the update is at most
w˜i|∆pi| − (∆si + si − piw˜i + pix˜i − piw˜i) · sign(∆pi)
= w˜i|∆pi| − sign(∆pi)∆si − pi|xi − w˜i| − pi|x˜i − w˜i|.
As −pi|xi− w˜i| ≤ 0 and −pi|x˜i− w˜i| ≤ −pi|x¯i− w˜i|, we obtain the same
upper bound on the term pi · span{x¯i, xi, w˜i} as in Case 2. The rest of the
argument is the same as in Case 2.
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B Markets with Complementary Goods
The following lemma states several inequalities we will use. They can be
proved by simple arithmetic/calculus.
Lemma 11. (a) If 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, then (1 + ǫ)x − 1 ≤ ǫx.
(b) If 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, then 1− (1− ǫ)x ≤
(
1 + ǫ2(1−ǫ)
)
ǫx.
(c) If E ≥ 1, ǫ ≥ 0 and r := max
{
Eǫ
2 , ǫ
}
< 1, then (1− ǫ)1−E − 1 ≤ E−11−r ǫ.
(d) If E ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, then 1− (1 + ǫ)1−E ≤ (E − 1)ǫ.
(e) If x ≥ 1 and ǫ ≥ 0, then (1− ǫ)−x ≤ 1 + x1−ǫxǫ.
LEMMA 6. Let β = 2α − γ and suppose that β > 0 and the following
conditions hold:
1. f ≤ (1− 2δ)−1/β ≤ (2 − δ)1/γ since the last price update to pi;
2. α¯+ c1 + c2δ ≤ 1− δ;
3. (1 + δ + c1 + c2δ)λ ≤ 1,
where α¯ := 2(1−α)(1− 2δ)−γ/β
(
1 + αλ(1+δ)2(1−λ(1+δ))
)
. Then, when a price pi is
updated using rule (2), the value of φ stays the same or decreases.
Proof. The first condition is used with Lemma 2(b) to ensure that x¯i ≤
(2 − δ)wi, which implies
z¯i
wi
≤ 1. Then, by price update rule (2), |∆pi| =
λpi|x¯i − w˜i|/wi.
Step 1: This step shows that the amount of spending transferred due to a
price change is bounded by α¯wi|∆pi|.
By the first condition and Lemma 2(b), xi ≤ (1 − 2δ)
−γ/βwi. Hence by
definition of α¯, 2(1− α)
(
1 + λ(1+δ)2(1−λ(1+δ))
)
xi ≤ α¯wi.
Case 1(a): Price pi is increased to tpi, where t > 1, i.e. ∆pi = (t− 1)pi.
By Lemma 2(c), the spending increase on Gi due to this price increase
is at most (tpi)
(
xi
tα
)
− xipi = (t
1−α − 1)xipi.
By Lemma 11(a), t1−α−1 ≤ (1−α)(t−1). Hence 2(t1−α−1)pixi, which
is twice the upper bound on the spending drawn from other goods due to
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the price increase, satisfies
2(t1−α − 1)pixi ≤ 2(1− α)(1 − 2δ)
−γ/β(t− 1)piwi
≤ α¯wi
(
1 +
λ(1 + δ)
2(1 − λ(1 + δ))
)−1
|∆pi|
≤ α¯wi|∆pi|.
Case 1(b): Price pi is reduced to tpi, where t < 1.
By Lemma 2(d), the spending decrease on Gi due to this price decrease
is at most xipi − (tpi)
(
xi
tα
)
= (1− t1−α)xipi.
By price update rule (2), 1 > t ≥ 1 − λ(1 + δ). By Lemma 11(b),
(1− t1−α) ≤
(
1 + λ(1+δ)2(1−λ(1+δ))
)
(1−α)(1− t). Hence 2(1− t1−α)pixi, which is
twice the upper bound on the spending lost to other goods due to the price
reduction, satisfies
2(1− t1−α)pixi
≤ 2
(
1 +
λ(1 + δ)
2(1 − λ(1 + δ))
)
(1− α)(1 − t)pi(1− 2δ)
−γ/βwi
≤ α¯wi|∆pi|.
Step 2: Apply Lemma 10 with the result of Step 1 to show that the potential
function φ stays the same or decreases after a price update.
We assume ∆pi > 0. The proof is symmetric for ∆pi < 0. As the goods
are pairwise complements, when ∆pi > 0, Sinc = 0 and ∆si = Sdec.
Case 2(a): sign(xi − w˜i) is not flipped and xi moves towards w˜i.
By Lemma 10, the change to φ is at most −w˜i|∆pi|+2|∆si|+ c1λpi|x¯i−
w˜i| + c2δwi|∆pi|. Case 1(a) gives 2|∆si| ≤ α¯wi|∆pi|. Noting that w˜i/wi ≥
1− δ, this change is at most (α¯+ c1+ c2δ− (1− δ))λpi|x¯i− w˜i|. The second
condition in this lemma implies this change is zero or negative.
Case 2(b): sign(xi − w˜i) is not flipped and xi moves away from w˜i, or
sign(xi − w˜i) is flipped.
By Lemma 10, the change to φ is at most −pi|x¯i − w˜i| + w˜i|∆pi| +
c1λpi|x¯i − w˜i| + c2δwi|∆pi|. Noting that w˜i/wi ≤ 1 + δ, this change is at
most ((1 + δ + c1 + c2δ)λ − 1) pi|x¯i−w˜i|. The third condition in this lemma
implies this change is zero or negative.
C Bounds on the Warehouse Sizes
LEMMA 7. In Phase 1, the total net change to vi is bounded by O(
wi
λ d(fI)+
wi
λβd(2) log
β
δ ).
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Proof. In one day, vi shrinks by at most (d(f) − 1)wi; it can grow by at
most wi. Since f shrinks by a 1 − Θ(λ) factor every O(1) days while f ≥
21/β , during this part of Phase 1, vi can shrink by at most O(
∑
i≥0 d(fI[1−
Θ(λ)]i)wi) = O(
wi
λ d(fI)), the equality following because d(f) grows at least
linearly. In this part of Phase 1, v(i) grows by at most wi log fI = O(wid(fI)).
The remainder of Phase 1 yields a further possible change of d(2) to vi
per day, for a total of O(wiλβd(2) log
1
δ/β ) = O(
wi
λβd(2) log
β
δ ).
LEMMA 8. Let a1, a2, k > 0. Suppose that vi ≤ v
∗
i − a1wi and that
κa1 ≥ 4λ
2. Let τ be the time of a price update of pi to pi,1. Suppose that
henceforth pi ≤ e
f¯pi,1 for some f¯ ≥ 0. If k ≥
2
κa1
(f¯ + a2), then by time
τ + (k + 1) the warehouse stock will have increased to more than v∗i − a1wi,
or by at least a2wi, whichever is the lesser increase.
Lemma 12. Let a1, a2, k > 0. Suppose that vi ≥ v
∗
i + a1wi. Let τ be the
time of a price update of pi to pi,1. Suppose that henceforth pi ≥ e
−f¯pi,1 for
some f¯ ≥ 0. If k ≥ 1κa1 (f¯+a2), then by time τ +(k+1) the warehouse stock
will have decreased to less than v∗i + a1wi, or by at least a2wi, whichever is
the lesser decrease.
Proof. Suppose that vi ≥ v
∗
i +a1wi throughout (or the result holds trivially).
Then each price change by a multiplicative (1+µ∆t) is associated with a
target excess demand z¯i = x¯i−wi−κ(vi−v
∗
i ), where zi = µwi. Furthermore,
the decrease to the warehouse stock since the previous price update is exactly
(xi − wi)∆t = [µwi + κ(vi − v
∗
i )]∆t ≥ (µ+ κa1)wi∆t.
Note that 1 + x ≤ ex for |x| ≤ 1. Thus 1 + µ∆t ≤ eµ∆t.
Suppose that over the next k days there are l − 1 price changes; let the
next l price changes be by 1+µ1∆t1, 1+µ2∆t2, · · · , 1+µl∆tl. Note that the
total price change satisfies e−f¯ ≤ Π1≤i≤l(1 + µi∆ti) ≤ e
∑
1≤i≤l µi∆ti . Thus∑
1≤i≤l µi∆ti ≥ −f¯ .
We conclude that when the l-th price change occurs, the warehouse stock
will have decreased by at least
∑
1≤i≤l(µi + κa1)wi∆ti ≥ (−f¯ + kκa1)wi. If
k ≥ 1κa1 (f¯ + a2), then the warehouse stock decreases by at least a2wi.
THEOREM 2. Suppose that the ratios χi/wi are all equal. Suppose that
the prices are always fI-bounded. Also suppose that each price is updated at
least once a day. Suppose further that at the start of Phase 1 the warehouses
are all safe. Finally, suppose that for all i:
1. χi ≥
512
β wi and χi ≥ 8v(fI)wi.
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2. δ = κχi2wi .
3. λ2 ≤ κχi32wi .
Then the warehouse stocks never go outside their outer buffers (i.e. they
never overflow or run out of stock); furthermore, after D(fI) +
32
β +
2
κ days
every warehouse will be safe thereafter.
Proof. We will consider warehouse i. We will say that vi lies in a particular
zone to specify how full or empty the warehouse is.
AfterD(fI) days, Phase 2 has been reached. By the first condition, in this
period of time the warehouse stock can change by at most v(fI)wi ≤ χi/8,
so vi can have moved out by at most one zone; thus it lies in the middle
buffer or a more central zone.
We show that henceforth the tendency is to improve, i.e. move toward
the central zone, but there can be fluctuations of up to one zone width. The
result is that every warehouse remains within its outer zone, and after a
suitable time they will all be in either their inner or central zone.
In Phase 2, the prices are (1 − 2δ)−1/β bounded, we can conclude that
they are in the range [1 − 2δ/β, 1 + 4δ/β] if 2δ/β ≤ 12 and δ ≤
1
4 . Further,
this is contained in the range [e−4δ/β , e4δ/β ]. Hence pi can change by at most
a factor of e±8δ/β .
First we show that vi can move outward by at most one zone width.
By Lemma 12 (taking a1 such that a1wi is the width of one zone, i.e. a1 =
1
8χi/wi, a2 = 0 and f¯ = 8δ/β), after 8δ/(βκa1) days the value of vi will have
returned to value vi(t) or remained below this value. During this period of
time, the stock can increase by at most 8δwi/(βκa1). Note that by κχ/2 =
δwi, a1 =
1
8χi/wi and the first condition, 8δwi/(βκa1) = 32wi/β ≤
1
16χi,
which is half the width of a zone. This guarantees that the stock will never
be overflow.
By Lemma 8 (taking a1 =
1
8χi/wi, a2 =
1
4χi/wi and f¯ = 8δ/β), vi
reaches the upper central zone after (8δ/β + a2)/(κa1) =
32
β +
2
κ days. Ap-
plying the argument in the last paragraph anew shows that henceforth vi
remains within the upper inner buffer.
We apply the same argument to the low zones using Lemma 8 (here
we need to use the third condition). The same results are achieved, but
they take up to twice as long, and the possible increase in stock is twice as
large as the possible decrease in the previous case, but still only one zone’s
worth.
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D Unwinding the Conditions in the Complemen-
tary Case
Lemma 5, Theorem 6 and Theorem 2 require several constraints on the
parameters κ, δ, λ, c1, c2. We unwind these conditions to show how these
parameters depend on the market parameters α, γ and β. We list the con-
ditions below:
1. 4κ(1 + c2) ≤ λc1 ≤ 1/2;
2. (1− 2δ)−1/β ≤ (2− δ)1/γ ;
3. α¯+ c1 + c2δ ≤ 1− δ where
α¯ = 2(1 − α)(1− 2δ)−γ/β
(
1 +
λ(1 + δ)
2(1 − λ(1 + δ))
)
;
4. (1 + δ + c1 + c2δ)λ ≤ 1;
5. χi ≥
512
β wi and χi ≥ 8v(fI)wi;
6. δ = κχi2wi ;
7. λ2 ≤ κχi32wi .
Recall that without loss of generality we may assume χi/wi are the same
for all i. Let r = χiwi . When r ≥ max
{
512
β , 8v(fI)
}
, Condition (5) is satisfied.
We first impose that
δ ≤ min
{
β
2γ
,
1
4
}
, λ ≤
3
7
, c1 = δ, c2 = 2. (8)
Condition (4) is then satisfied. Condition (1) becomes
24
r
≤ λ. (9)
By Lemma 11(e), (1 − 2δ)−γ/β ≤ 1 + 4γβ δ as 2γ/β ≤ 1/2 and γ/β ≥ 1.
Thus Condition (2) is satisfied when 1+ 4γβ δ ≤ 2− δ, which is equivalent to
δ ≤
β
4γ + β
. (10)
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Condition (3) is satisfied when (8 + 4γ/β)δ + 7λ/6 ≤ ln 12(1−α) : this im-
plies (8+4γ/β)δ+ 1+δ2(1−λ(1+δ))λ ≤ ln
1
2(1−α) and hence 2(1−α) exp
(
4δγ/β + 1+δ2(1−λ(1+δ))
)
≤
exp(−8β). This further implies
α¯ = 2(1 − α)(1 − 2δ)−γ/β
(
1 +
1 + δ
2(1 − λ(1 + δ))
)
≤ 1− 4δ.
When we further impose that
(8 + 4γ/β)δ ≤
1
2
ln
1
2(1− α)
, (11)
Condition (3) can be satisfied when
λ ≤
3
7
ln
1
2(1 − α)
. (12)
Using the bounds on δ in (8), (10) and (11), and substituting into Con-
dition (6), yields
κ ≤
2
r
·min
{
β
2(γ + β)
,
1
4
,
β
4γ + β
,
1
2(8 + 4γ/β)
ln
1
2(1 − α)
}
=
2
r
·min
{
β
4γ + β
,
1
2(8 + 4γ/β)
ln
1
2(1− α)
}
.
Using the bounds on λ in (8), (9) and (12), together with Condition (7),
yields
24
r
≤ λ ≤ min
{
3
7
,
3
7
ln
1
2(1 − α)
,
√
κr
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}
.
Note that r = χi/wi needs to be sufficiently large to ensure that there is a
choice of λ which satisfies both the upper and lower bounds.
The market is defined by the parameters α, γ, β. Then κ, λ, r are chosen
to satisfy the conditions. The price update rule uses κ, λ, while the ware-
house sizes are lower bounded by rwi. The parameters c1, c2 are needed only
for the analysis.
E Markets with Mixtures of Substitutes and Com-
plements
E.1 Phase 1 and One-Time Markets
As with the case of markets of complementary goods, it suffices to analyze
the one-time markets in Phase 1.
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Lemma 13. When the market is f -bounded,
1. if pi = rp
∗
i /f where 1 ≤ r ≤ f
2, then xi ≥ wif
βr−E;
2. if pi = fp
∗
i /q where 1 ≤ q ≤ f
2, then xi ≤ wif
−βqE.
Proof. We prove the first part; the second part is symmetric. Let (p′−i, rp
∗
i /f)
be the f -bounded prices maximizing xi when pi = rp
∗
i /f . First consider
adjusting the prices from p∗ to (p′−i, p
∗
i /f) by smooth proportionate multi-
plicative changes (or equivalently, proportionate linear changes to the terms
log pj for all j). From the definition of β in Definition 3, it is easy to show
that the resulting demand for xi is at least wif
β. Now increase pi by a factor
of r. As by assumption E is the upper bound on the price elasticity, the
increase in the value of pi reduces xi by at most r
−E, yielding the bound
xi ≥ wif
βr−E.
Lemma 14. Suppose that β > 0. Further, suppose that the prices are
updated independently using price update rule (1), and that 0 < λ ≤ 12E−1 .
Let p denote the current price vector and p′ denote the price vector after one
day.
1. If f(p)β ≥ 2, then f(p′) ≤
(
1− λ2
)
f(p).
2. If f(p)β ≤ 2, then f(p′) ≤ f(p)1−λβ/(2 ln 2).
Proof. Suppose that pi = r
p∗i
f(p) , where 1 ≤ r ≤ f(p)
2. By Lemma 13,
xi ≥ wif(p)
βr−E and hence xi−wiwi ≥ f(p)
βr−E − 1. When pi is updated
using price update rule (1), the new price p′i satisfies
p′i ≥ r
p∗i
f(p)
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)βr−E − 1
}]
.
Let h3(r) := r
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, (f(p)βr−E − 1)
}]
. When f(p)βr−E ≥ 2,
dh3(r)
dr = 1 + λ > 0; When f(p)
βr−E ≤ 2,
d
dr
h3(r) = 1− λ
(
1 + (E − 1)f(p)βr−E
)
≥ 1− λ(2E − 1) ≥ 0.
Thus
p′i ≥
p∗i
f(p)
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)β − 1
}]
.
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Similarly, suppose pj satisfies pj =
1
qf(p)p
∗
j , where 1 ≤ q ≤ f(p)
2. By
Lemma 13, xj ≤ wjf(p)
−βqE and hence
xj−wj
wj
≤ f(p)−βqE − 1. When pj is
updated using price update rule (1), the new price p′j satisfies
p′j ≤
1
q
f(p)p∗j
(
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)−βqE − 1
})
.
Let h4(q) :=
1
q
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)−βqE − 1
}]
. When
f(p)−βqE ≥ 2, ddqh4(q) = −
1
q2
(1 + λ) < 0. When f(p)−βqE ≤ 2,
d
dq
h4(q) =
1
q2
[
−1 + λ
(
1 + (E − 1)f(p)−βqE
)]
≤
1
q2
(−1 + λ(2E − 1)) ≤ 0.
Thus
p′j ≤ f(p)p
∗
j
[
1 + λ ·min
{
1, f(p)−β − 1
}]
= f(p)p∗j
[
1 + λ(f(p)−β − 1)
]
.
The remainder of the proof is exactly same as the the final part of the
proof of Lemma 4.
E.2 Ongoing Markets
Lemma 15. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, λE ≤ 1 and λ ≤ 12 , then |∆Ss| ≤
(α′ + 2(E − 1))xi|∆pi|.
Proof. There are two cases.
Case 1. The price of Gi is reduced from pi to p
′
i = tpi, where t < 1.
Then x′i ≤ t
−Exi and hence ∆si ≤ (t
1−E − 1)pixi. Then
|∆Ss| = |∆Sc|+∆si ≤ α
′xi|∆pi|+ (t
1−E − 1)pixi
≤ α′xi|∆pi|+ 2(E − 1)(1 − t)pixi.
The last inequality holds by applying Lemma 11(c) with max
{
Eλ
2 , λ
}
≤ 1/2
and t ≥ 1− λ. Noting that (1− t)pi = |∆pi|, completes the proof.
Case 2. The price of Gi is raised from pi to p
′
i = tpi, where t > 1.
Then x′i ≥ t
−Exi and hence ∆si ≥ (t
1−E − 1)pixi. Then
|∆Ss| = |∆Sc| −∆si ≤ α
′xi|∆pi|+ (1− t
1−E)pixi
≤ α′xi|∆pi|+ (E − 1)(t− 1)pixi.
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The last inequality holds by applying Lemma 11(d). Noting that (t−1)pi =
|∆pi|, completes the proof.
The following lemma proves convergence in the market with mixtures of
substitutes and complements while incorporating warehouses.
LEMMA 9. Suppose Assumption 1 holds and β, as defined in Definition
3, satisfies β > 0. Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1. f ≤ (1− 2δ)−1/β ≤ (2 − δ)1/(2E−β) since the last price update to pi;
2. 2α′(1− 2δ)−(2E−β)/β + c1 + c2δ ≤ 1− δ;
3.
(
2α′′(1− 2δ)−(2E−β)/β + 1 + δ + c1 + c2δ
)
λ ≤ 1,
where α′′ := α′+2(E − 1). Then, when a price pi is updated using rule (2),
the value of φ stays the same or decreases.
Proof. The first condition is used with Lemma 13 to ensure that xi, x¯i ≤
(1 − 2δ)−(2E−β)/βwi ≤ (2 − δ)wi, and hence that
z¯i
wi
≤ 1. By price update
rule (2), |∆pi| = λpi|x¯i − w˜i|/wi.
We assume ∆pi > 0. The proof is symmetric for ∆pi < 0. Recall that
when ∆pi > 0, |∆Ss| = |∆Sc| −∆si.
Case 1: sign(xi − w˜i) is not flipped and xi moves towards w˜i.
By Lemma 10, the change to φ is at most −w˜i|∆pi|+∆si+|∆Sc|+|∆Ss|+
c1λpi|x¯i− w˜i|+ c2δwi|∆pi|, which is equal to −w˜i|∆pi|+2|∆Sc|+ c1λpi|x¯i−
w˜i|+c2δwi|∆pi|. Noting w˜i/wi ≥ 1−δ and xi ≤ (1−2δ)
−(2E−β)/βwi, and ap-
plying Assumption 1, implies that this change is at most
(
2α′(1− 2δ)−(2E−β)/β + c1 + c2δ − (1− δ)
)
wi|∆pi|.
Case 2: sign(xi−w˜i) is not flipped and xi moves away from w˜i, or sign(xi−
w˜i) is flipped.
By Lemma 10, the change to φ is at most −pi|x¯i− w˜i|+ w˜i|∆pi|−∆si+
|∆Sc|+ |∆Ss|+ c1λpi|x¯i− w˜i|+ c2δwi|∆pi|, which is equal to −pi|x¯i− w˜i|+
w˜i|∆pi|+ 2|∆Ss| + c1λpi|x¯i − w˜i| + c2δwi|∆pi|. Noting that w˜i/wi ≤ 1 + δ
and xi ≤ (1−2δ)
−(2E−β)/βwi, and applying Assumption 1, implies that this
change is at most(
(2α′′(1− 2δ)−(2E−β)/β + 1 + δ + c1 + c2δ)λ− 1
)
pi|x¯i − w˜i|.
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F Unwinding the Conditions in the Mixture Case
Lemma 5, Lemma 9 and Theorem 2 require several constraints on the pa-
rameters κ, δ, λ, c1, c2. We unwind these conditions to show how these pa-
rameters depend on the market parameters β and α′. We list the conditions
below:
1. 4κ(1 + c2) ≤ λc1 ≤ 1/2;
2. (1− 2δ)−1/β ≤ (2− δ)1/(2E−β);
3. 2α′(1− 2δ)−(2E−β)/β + c1 + c2δ ≤ 1− δ;
4.
(
2α′′(1− 2δ)−(2E−β)/β + 1 + δ + c1 + c2δ
)
λ ≤ 1;
5. χi ≥
512
β wi and χi ≥ 8v(fI)wi;
6. δ = κχi2wi ;
7. λ2 ≤ κχi32wi .
We first impose the conditions
δ ≤ min
{
β
4(2E − β)
,
1
4
}
, λ ≤ 1, c1 = δ, c2 = 2. (13)
As in Section D, let r = χiwi . When r ≥ max
{
512
β , 8v(fI)
}
and
λ ≥
24
r
, (14)
Conditions (5) and (1) are satisfied.
By Lemma 11(e), (1−2δ)−(2E−β)/β ≤ 1+ 4(2E−β)β δ as
2(2E−β)δ
β ≤ 1/2 and
2E−β
β ≥ 1. Thus Condition (2) and (3) are satisfied when 1+
4(2E−β)
β δ ≤ 2−δ
and 2α′
(
1 + 4(2E−β)β δ
)
+ 4δ ≤ 1 respectively, which are equivalent to
δ ≤
β
β + 4(2E − β)
, δ ≤
(1− 2α′)β
8α′(2E − β) + 4β
. (15)
Condition (4) is satisfied when(
2α′′
(
1 +
4(2E − β)
β
δ
)
+ 1 + 4δ
)
λ ≤ 1.
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The bounds on δ in (13) gives 4(2E−β)β δ ≤ 1 and 4δ ≤ 1, hence Condition
(4) is satisfied when
λ ≤
1
4α′′ + 2
=
1
8E + 4α′ − 6
. (16)
Using the bounds on δ in (13) and (15), and substituting into Condition
(6), yields
κ ≤
2
r
·min
{
β
β + 4(2E − β)
,
(1− 2α′)β
8α′(2E − β) + 4β
}
.
Using the bounds on λ in (13), (14) and (16), together with Condition
(7), yields
24
r
≤ λ ≤ min
{
1
8E + 4α′ − 6
,
√
κr
32
}
.
The market is defined by the parameters E, β and α′. Then κ, λ, r are
chosen to satisfy the conditions. The price update rule uses κ, λ, while the
warehouse sizes are lower bounded by rwi. The parameters c1, c2 are needed
only for the analysis.
F.1 Example Scenario: N -Level Nested CES Type Utilities
We focus on one particular good i. Let A1, A2, · · · , AN be the square
nodes along the path from good i to the root of the utility tree, and let
ρ1, ρ2, · · · , ρN be the associated ρ values. Let σk =
1
1−ρk
for 1 ≤ k ≤ N .
Let Sk denote the set of goods which are in the subtree rooted at Ak. Let
hk denote the total spending on all goods in Sk and let ANC(j) denote the
least common ancestor of goods i and j.
Keller derived the following formulae:
∂xi/∂pj
xi/pj
=
sj
hN
(σN − 1) +
N−1∑
q=ANC(j)
sj
hq
(σq − σq+1)
∂xi/∂pi
xi/pi
= −σ1 +
si
hN
(σN − 1) +
N−1∑
q=1
si
hq
(σq − σq+1).
We now compute the Adverse Market Elasticity of good i. When the price
of good i is reduced by a factor of (1 − δ) (think of δ as being very small),
raise the prices of all the complements of good i by a factor of 1/(1− δ) and
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reduce the prices of all the substitutes of good i by a factor of (1 − δ). By
the above formulae, x′i ≥ xit
βi , where
βi = −
∂xi/∂pi
xi/pi
−
∑
j 6=i
∣∣∣∣∂xi/∂pjxi/pj
∣∣∣∣
= σ1 −
si
hN
(σN − 1)−
N−1∑
q=1
si
hq
(σq − σq+1)
−
∑
j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ sjhN (σN − 1) +
N−1∑
q=ANC(j)
sj
hq
(σq − σq+1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ σ1 −
si
hN
|σN − 1| −
N−1∑
q=1
si
hq
|σq − σq+1|
−
∑
j
 sj
hN
|σN − 1|+
N−1∑
q=ANC(j)
sj
hq
|σq − σq+1|

= σ1 − |σN − 1|
∑
j∈SN
sj
hN
− N−1∑
q=1
|σq − σq+1|∑
j∈Sq
sj
hq

= σ1 − |σN − 1| −
N−1∑
q=1
|σq − σq+1|.
Note that we do not require any two goods to always be substitutes or always
complements.
The lower bound on βi is tight when
hN
hN1
,
hN−1
hN−2
, · · · , h2h1 ,
h1
si
are all very
large. Set β, as defined in Definition 3, to mini βi.
Also note that
∂xi/∂pi
xi/pi
=
si
hN
−1− N∑
q=1
σq
(
hN
hq−1
−
hN
hq
)
≥ max
{
1, max
1≤k≤N
σk
}− si
hN
−
N∑
q=1
(
si
hq−1
−
si
hq
)
= −max
{
1, max
1≤k≤N
σk
}
.
Let Ei = max {1,max1≤k≤N σk} and set E = maxiEi.
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Keller also derived that
∂sj
∂pi
= xi
 sj
hN
(σN − 1) +
N−1∑
q=ANC(j)
sj
hq
(σq − σq+1)
 .
This yields∑
j 6=i
|∆sj|
≤ (1− λ)−Exi|∆pi|
∑
j 6=i
 sj
hN
|σN − 1|+
N−1∑
q=ANC(j)
sj
hq
|σq − σq+1|

≤ xi|∆pi|(1− λ)
−E
|σN − 1|+ N−1∑
q=1
|σq − σq+1|
 .
Let α′i = (1 − λ)
−E
(
|σN − 1|+
∑N−1
q=1 |σq − σq+1|
)
. Assumption 1 is satis-
fied with α′ = maxi α
′
i. Hence the bounds from Theorems 3 and 2 apply.
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